IPA encourages members to submit content in the form of articles, commentary, and research summaries for inclusion on the blog. Below is an article by U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer Dan Burns on how to address failures and limitations in the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Information Groups (MIGs).
Note: The views expressed in this article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the United States Marine Corps.
By Dan Burns, Marine Corps Officer, Okinawa, Japan
Introduction: A Decade of Promise, No Delivery
Over ten years ago, the Marine Corps created Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Information Groups (MIGs) to integrate emerging information-related capabilities—cyber, space, electronic warfare (EW), and influence—into MAGTF operations. The 17XX information maneuver community was intended to give Marine commanders a decisive non-kinetic edge, shaping adversary decisions and accelerating kill chains in a multi-domain fight.
A decade later, the verdict is clear: the concept has failed. MIGs have not delivered operational information warfare effects. Instead, they’ve become tactical holding pens for a boutique capability that duplicates staff work, slows decision cycles, and remains disconnected from where real information warfare is planned and authorized—MARFORPAC, INDOPACOM, and the joint force.
The Marine Corps now faces a decision point:
- Fix it by dismantling the MIG construct, building true information warfare integration cells (G-39s), and pushing billets to theater commands.
- Or kill it and stop wasting Marines in a capability area already dominated by joint forces with bigger budgets, deeper expertise, and real authorities.
The worst option is continuing the status quo: pretending we can fight and win in the information environment with a structure that has never produced results.
The MIG Concept: A Decade-Long Failed Experiment
The MIGs were built to integrate cyber, space, EW, and influence operations into MAGTF planning. On paper, it made sense. In practice:
- No operational wins: A decade of experimentation has produced no decisive non-kinetic outcomes in real-world operations. Every “success” has been scripted in exercises.
- No authorities: The actual approval to execute cyber payloads, re-task space assets, or launch sensitive influence operations resides at MARFORPAC, INDOPACOM, or interagency levels. A tactical MIG can plan endlessly but cannot act.
- No integration: Without a G-39 construct in MEF, Division, or MAW staffs, 17XX Marines are left to “self-integrate,” creating parallel targeting tracks that conflict with fires, maneuver, intelligence, and comms processes.
After ten years, the Marine Corps is left with a headquarters concept that absorbs manpower and produces PowerPoint products—but no operational effect.
Duplication and Friction Across the MEF Staff
The placement of 17XX forces inside MIGs creates duplication and staff churn across every warfighting function:
- Targeting chaos: Fires and Effects Coordination Cells (FECC) build one target deck, while MIG-driven IO and cyber target lists compete for commander attention. Deconfliction happens late, delaying kill-chain execution.
- Conflicting narratives: Separate briefs from G-2, MIG, and maneuver cells give commanders different versions of the battlespace, undermining confidence in decision support.
- Process churn: Instead of integrating effects, 17XX Marines are forced to build parallel products, adding friction without delivering combat power.
This is not a personality problem; it’s a force design failure. The Marine Corps created capabilities without creating the command-and-control structures (G-39s) needed to integrate them.
Operational Reality: The Theater-Level Fight
Non-kinetic warfare is not a tactical game. Decisions to launch cyber payloads, re-task space assets, or employ sensitive influence effects are made at theater and national levels, not MEF-level cells.
- MARFORPAC and INDOPACOM own the fight: Real-world information campaigns are designed and authorized in joint and interagency boards. MEFs lack both authority and connectivity to compete meaningfully.
- Freedom Shield 25 exposed the gap: An Information Coordination Center (ICC) team produced high-value counter-narrative products during the exercise, yet real non-kinetic targeting had to be pushed all the way to the national level because no MEF or MARFOR process existed to act.
- Negative learning: Commanders walked away believing IW could be executed quickly, when in reality the Marine Corps has no functioning kill chain for non-kinetics.
Keeping 17XX Marines in MIGs divorces them from operational decision nodes, guaranteeing they will remain spectators in the real information war.
Dangerous Myths: The Snake Oil Problem
For over a decade, the Marine Corps has allowed non-kinetic warfighting to be sold through slick slideshows and fantasy concepts. Buzzwords like “multi-domain maneuver corridor” are briefed as if they represent proven capabilities. They do not.
- Non-kinetic effects are fragile and fleeting: Cyber payloads are patched, EW windows close in minutes, influence operations are countered rapidly by capable adversaries.
- The corridor is a mirage: There is no guaranteed information dominance lane against a peer adversary with its own cyber, EW, and deception capabilities.
- False confidence kills: Building operational plans on cartoonish slides about information dominance sets Marines up for catastrophic surprises when those corridors collapse under enemy pressure.
This is what happens when a decade of organizational failure is masked by aspirational briefs instead of hard results. We are betting Marine lives on capabilities we do not possess.
Tempo Failure: WWII Processes in a Machine-Speed Fight
Marine Corps non-kinetic targeting still relies on a 96-hour Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle, a process designed in WWII for deliberate bomber missions over Europe. This approach may work for kinetic air campaigns, but it is lethal deadweight in information warfare.
Modern information fights move in minutes or seconds. Adversaries deploy cyber payloads, electromagnetic effects, and influence narratives dynamically, adapting in real time. By the time a Marine non-kinetic option clears staffing and cycles into a 96-hour plan, the target has shifted, the opportunity has closed, or the adversary has already won the narrative.
This is not a minor process inefficiency. It is a structural tempo mismatch that makes Marine information warfare operationally irrelevant in a near-peer fight. Until we abandon WWII-era planning constructs and adopt real-time targeting and decision cycles, non-kinetic capabilities will remain aspirational slides—not combat power.
The COMMSTRAT Mirage
One of the clearest signs that the Marine Corps cannot yet fight and win in the information environment is that commanders still point to COMMSTRAT as their “information warfare capability.”
The reality is simple:
- COMMSTRAT is public affairs, not IW. Its focus is domestic audiences, reputation management, and shaping narratives for home consumption—not messaging an adversary or delivering cognitive effects in a fight.
- It’s the only authority commanders have: Because true IW authorities live at theater and national levels, the only thing a MEF commander can legally direct on the spot is COMMSTRAT. So they default to it.
- Operationally irrelevant: Trying to message an adversary through COMMSTRAT channels would be slow, fragmented, often broken in translation, and easily ignored. It is not combat power.
The fact that a decade of “information maneuver experimentation” has left commanders believing public affairs is their IW tool tells you everything you need to know: the Marine Corps does not have an IW capability.
The Joint Force Already Does This Better
Even if structure and authorities were fixed, the Marine Corps faces another hard truth:
- Joint forces own this mission: The Army fields dedicated IO brigades and robust cyber/EW units with deeper manning, technical depth, and specialized pipelines.
- USCYBERCOM, Space Command, and the Air Force have the infrastructure, authorities, and global reach to deliver effects Marines cannot match.
- Attempting to replicate this at small scale is a waste of manpower and creates the illusion that the MAGTF can independently wage information warfare. It cannot.
The Options: Fix It or Kill It
We’ve spent a decade proving the MIG construct doesn’t work. There are only two real options left:
Option 1 – Fix It:
- Cut MIG back to its original Marine Headquarters Group (MHG) role: comms, admin, HQ support.
- Stand up real G-39 directorates at every echelon to integrate IW with fires and maneuver.
- Push billets forward to MARFORPAC and INDOPACOM, where campaigns are built and authorities live.
Option 2 – Kill It:
- Acknowledge information warfare is a joint fight, already resourced and executed better by other services.
- Stop wasting Marines in an underpowered IW community that has never produced decisive results.
- Focus Marine talent on maneuver, fires, and intelligence, supporting joint IW instead of pretending we can duplicate it.
Option 3 – Status Quo (Worst Option):
- Keep MIGs staffed, keep generating parallel processes, keep delivering slides and synthetic IO victories while adversaries dominate the real information environment.
- Keep sending commanders into future fights expecting non-kinetic support that will not arrive.
Conclusion: End the Experiment Before It Costs Lives
The MIG construct has had over a decade to prove its worth. It has failed. The 17XX information maneuver force remains misplaced, misunderstood, and redundant, adding friction to MEF staffs while real IW is fought at MARFOR, INDOPACOM, and joint levels.
The Marine Corps can fix it—strip the MIG back to MHG, build G-39 integration billets, and push billets to the commands where non-kinetic warfighting actually happens. Or it can kill it, admit the joint force already owns this fight, and stop wasting Marines and commander attention on illusions.
What it cannot do is keep feeding commanders fantasies and calling them capabilities. In combat, illusions don’t win fights—they get Marines killed. And that’s a cost this service cannot afford.
Author Bio
Dan is a U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer with over 17 years of experience in Indo-Pacific operations, information warfare coordination, and multi-domain operational planning. He has served as the Information Warfare Coordinator for III MEF and Director of the All-Domain Operations Center.