IPA encourages members to submit content in the form of articles, commentary, and research summaries for inclusion on the blog. Below is an article by retired U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer Ray Gerber on how to address failures and limitations in the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Information Groups (MIGs). Ray submitted this article in response to an IPA blog post written by USMC Officer Dan Burns, “Kill It or Fix It: Why Marine Corps Information Warfare has Failed after a Decade of MIGs.”
Note: The views expressed in this article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the United States Marine Corps.
By Col Ray Gerber, USMC (Ret.)
Dan Burns offers a provocative critique of the Marine Corps Information Groups (MIGs), raising valid concerns about authorities, intermediate headquarters, and USMC organizational coherence. But his conclusion—that the MIGs have failed and should be dismantled—goes too far.
As the former Commanding Officer of III MIG (2020–2022) and later as Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) G39 (2022–2024), I’ve seen firsthand how MIGs contribute to deterrence and campaigning across the globe. Coupled with consistent engagements with current and former MIG commanders, subordinate battalion commanders, and fellow information warfare professionals, my assessment is clear: the MIG is not a failed experiment. It is still maturing, it is already delivering value, and walking away now would repeat past mistakes.
The Reality of MIG Contributions
Critics argue that MIGs have not produced decisive wins in information warfare. That argument misunderstands the nature of deterrence. Deterrence is rarely decisive; its effects are cumulative, layered, and often invisible until failure.
Every day, MIG Marines contribute to this aggregate effect:
- Shaping Perceptions – Overtly the MIG Communications and Strategy Marines consistently document Marine readiness and credibility, influencing both allies and adversaries by showcasing the MIG as well as other elements of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) through truthful information.
- Assuring Command & Control (C2) conducting Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) – Communications, Intelligence, and Radio battalions ensure the MEF has the access it needs to fight via assured networks at all levels of classification.
- Forward Campaigning – Intelligence and Information Warfare (IW) professionals work across the Pacific, Europe, and beyond, setting conditions in key terrain. Their work is that of quiet professionals, rarely acknowledged and not celebrated in public.
- Integration with Joint Force – Space and cyber activities increasingly contribute to joint campaigning, now across all domains. Campaigning in this context requires demonstrated competence which in turn creates confidence for employment during crisis.
- Integrated Deterrence – Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies connect the aforementioned capabilities and more directly with allies and partners.
These contributions are not hypothetical—they are operational, daily, and indispensable. - Commanding & Control – The MIG’s HQ serves as the 06 lead unit that synchronizes these efforts be they in the creation and certification of subordinate elements or in the prosecution of the MEF’s Counter C-C5ISRT efforts, across domains.
Addressing the Critiques
Burns is right to highlight organizational and authorities challenges. But these issues argue for broader reform beyond the MIG, and certainly not disestablishment of those units.
Authorities: MARFORPAC has already demonstrated how to secure and exercise authorities for subordinate MIG Marines in both steady-state campaigning and exercises that replicate crisis conditions. Progress is being made. II MIG’s unique circumstances find them being addressed by engagement with multiple Geographic Combatant Commanders. There is room to assist them, but they are making their own luck.
Intermediate Headquarters: The real friction lies in bloated and incoherent staff structures, not in the existence of the MIG. Eliminating MIGs would not solve the bureaucracy’s problem—it would strip away the one formation focused on delivering IW effects.
Lessons from History
We have been here before. Prior to Desert Storm, Gen Al Gray created Surveillance and Reconnaissance Intelligence Groups (SRIG) to address USMC C2 and ISR shortfalls. But the SRIG was disestablished before it matured, and the Corps lost precious time and capability. It was disbanded in haste, and after much of the same arguments about meeting potential that Burn’s article posits.
The establishment of the MIG in 2017, alongside recognition of Information as a warfighting function, was a corrective step. While still under-resourced and unevenly equipped, MIGs are only now reaching maturity. To abandon them at this stage would repeat the SRIG mistake—only this time in the middle of strategic competition and amidst and unforgiving changed character of war.
The Path Forward
The answer is not to kill the MIGs, but to evolve them. Three steps are essential:
- Re-examine Headquarters Roles – Clarify and right-size intermediate headquarters staffs, ensuring coherence in roles and missions. Reduce bureaucracy, embrace technology. Focus staffs on enabling commander decision making and more importantly serving subordinate units who do the work of the Marine Corps.
- Formalize the MIG’s Role – Make the MIG not just a staff adjunct but the unit responsible for delivering assured C2, ISR, and IW effects, while countering adversary capabilities to achieve the same. Allow the staffs to plan, but leave actions to units lead by commanders.
- Dare to think boldly – Consider a future where the Marine Corps adds a new element to the MAGTF dedicated to IW. A MEF level formation responsible for C5ISR-T and counter-C5ISR-T, with MIG Bn’s designated to habitually support MEF Major Subordinate Commands with like capabilities and task-organized units formed to serve alongside Marine Expeditionary Units. Provide that unit with a Fire Support Coordination capability to pair lethal fires with non-lethal effects rendered from the MIG HQ Information Coordination Center. This puts action into the hands of a purpose built unit, and allows the MEF staff to plan across the MEF and integrate with joint and combined forces.
These steps would not only preserve the MIG’s progress but position the Marine Corps at the forefront of modern campaigning, it would also create critical durable linkage to the joint force at echelons above the MEF.
Conclusion
Now is not the time to dismantle the MIG. It is the time to demand more of it. Eliminating the Corps’ only purpose-built information warfare formation would waste years of investment and hard-earned lessons, just as the strategic environment makes such capabilities indispensable.
The better path is to refine our staffs, empower the MIGs, and expand their role. The future of deterrence and warfighting will be decided first in the information domain—and the Marine Corps cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past.
Author bio:
Ray Gerber is a retired USMC Colonel, intelligence officer, whose last two tours were at III MIG as the commanding officer (2020-2022) and then at Marine Forces Pacific as the G39/G6 (2022-2024). Since retirement about a year ago, Ray continues to work in the field both in a venture capital-backed software startup (Smack Technologies) as well as for Obsidian Solutions Group supporting the Marine Corps. While the views in this article are his own, Ray worked in close coordination with current MIG Commanding Officers (COs), former MIG COs, future MIG COs recently selected, and a number of other USMC Information Warfare professionals in both the Fleet Marine Force as well as the supporting establishment.