In May 1942, the U.S. Navy needed to confirm where the Imperial Japanese fleet was heading. Commander Joseph Rochefort’s team at Station HYPO instructed the garrison at Midway Atoll to broadcasta fake, unencrypted radio message complaining about a broken water distillation plant. Within hours, U.S. operators intercepted a Japanese transmission reporting that target “AF” was running low on water. The Pacific Fleet had set the trap.
Setting this trap and cracking JN-25 were only half the battle. Success required Admiral Chester Nimitz’s coup d’œil, which Clausewitz conceptualized as a commander’s intuitive, strategic grasp of the battlefield. The Fleet Admiral had to trust the cognitive picture that Rochefort’s team produced and commit his Fleet’s outnumbered carriers to the ambush. Nimitz envisioned the operational environment as more than just ship hulls and armor, targeting the adversary in the information dimension through perception and deception. A takeaway from this historical example is that although a staff can create or recognize an informational advantage, commanders must understand and act on that advantage.
Today, the U.S. joint force possesses a mature kinetic targeting structure. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, provides a highly effective framework for joint targeting, particularly when the desired effect can be tied to physical systems and observable indicators. If a Joint Force Commander (JFC) needs a precision munition delivered through an adversary’s window at a specific time, U.S. warfighters have the processes and procedures to execute flawlessly. However, in competition against pacing threats operating constantly in the gray zone, achieving Nimitz’s coup d’œil is much harder. The Russian “firehose of falsehood” and ubiquitous Chinese fake news saturate the information environment.
While joint and service staffs have made strides over the past decade, non-kinetic planning still frequently runs in parallel with kinetic targeting rather than interweaving with it. In armed conflict, planners will often build strike packages and execute a complex kinetic operation, then expect their information planners to build a supporting narrative. That sequential paradigm subordinates information to kinetic operations, leaving information planners to face an uphill battle in constructing strategic narratives for the commander.
In both competition and armed conflict, U.S. leaders recognized that winning the battle of the narrative in gray zone competition is essential. Elevating information to the seventh joint function and reconceptualizing operations in the information environment were among the intelligent doctrinal shifts to address this reality. To build upon these successful changes, commanders and staff officers must integrate narratives, deception, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO), space-enabled capabilities, and other non-kinetic effects into the commander’s decision cycle and targeting processes. The Joint Staff’s development of a non-kinetic effects cell (NKE Cell) suggests the force is already moving in this direction. To produce decision advantage, the cell needs a repeatable rhythm for sensing the cognitive terrain, selecting effects, executing authorized actions, assessing behavioral indicators, and adapting faster than the adversary. S3ARD — See, Select, Send, Assess, Repeat, Decide/Debrief — offers one practical way to provide that rhythm. S3ARD is not doctrinal yet, but the construct is a useful practitioner framework for operationalizing the emerging NKE Cell concept. S3ARD does not replace the joint targeting cycle or service targeting methods. It translates non-kinetic possibilities into targetable effects that the existing process can use. Its value is in connecting cognitive effects to the commander’s decision cycle through authorities, risk, execution, and assessment.
According to DefenseScoop, the Joint Staff has been developing a non-kinetic effects cell designed to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize non-kinetic effects into the planning and execution of operations globally. Air Force Brig. Gen. Ryan Messer, deputy director for global operations, J-39, described this shift as part of a broader effort to move cyber and other non-kinetic capabilities from the margins of operational planning to the forefront. His description captures the cultural change required: non-kinetic effects can no longer be “sprinkled on” after the fact. These effects must be integrated from the beginning as part of the commander’s operational approach.
However, the NKE Cell by itself is necessary but insufficient. The joint force needs a disciplined method for translating non-kinetic possibilities into targetable, assessable, and adaptable operational effects. S3ARD offers one such method, but it cannot become another staff process owned by a single specialty cell, like the J39. For S3ARD to work, the commander must own it, the operations staff must synchronize itacross current and future operations, and the NKE Cell must integrate the relevant capabilities, authorities, and assessments. This combined-arms approach aligns with best practices for communication synchronization: communication strategy is commander-centric, integrated with force employment and targeting, and refined across plans, future operations, and current operations.
Non-kinetic effects are generated through cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, deception, influence, space-enabled capabilities, and related informational activities, whose primary purpose is to alter adversary perceptions, decisions, operational cohesion, and (most importantly) behavior without immediate physical destruction. Other non-kinetic effects come from public affairs, which informs audiences. S3ARD offers a proposed targeting rhythm for those effects: one that runs in parallel with and feeds back into the joint targeting cycle.
Evolution, Not Erasure: Building the NKE Cell
For decades, IO Cells and J-39 directorates have done the heavy lifting of coordinating information-related capabilities. Nevertheless, coordination alone is not enough, as these capabilities may not be integrated from the start. Modern commands cannot afford to sprinkle information and influence into an operation after the main scheme of maneuver is already in place. Efforts to scale non-kinetic capabilities often experience friction because information-related capabilities operate under different authorities and timelines. Further, each discipline has a cadre of specialists who may or may not fully understand their counterparts’ roles and capabilities. When these elements merely coordinate rather than seamlessly fuse, we risk diluting the JFC’s informational power.
The NKE Cell should not be understood as a replacement for the J-39. Rather, it is a more operationalized version of the J-39 function: a cross-functional integration node that connects public affairs, cyberspace operations, EMSO, MILDEC, PSYOP, space, intelligence, operations, and plans to the commander’s decision cycle and the joint targeting process. The goal is to ensure the observables that constitute the informational “body language” of the joint force inextricably match the force’s deliberate actions. In other words, NKE Cells can help commanders minimize the “say-do gap.”
In combat, a cyberspace operation or an EMS effect that temporarily blinds an adversary’s coastal radar can provide a useful tactical effect. However, when that EMS effect is synchronized with an NKE Cell’s MILDEC maneuver that exploits the newly created blind spot and is amplified by targeted messaging, it can lead to an operational advantage. In certain environments, transmitting information may be the only targeting option. Nevertheless, when aimed at the right audience, narratives, themes, and messages can become some of the most powerful weapons in the targeting process.
S3ARD: A Framework to Target the Mind
Joint targeting offers a proven method for selecting targets, indicators, and physically observable assessment mechanisms. Operations in the information environment, however, are dynamic and complex, demanding an agile process tailored to cognitive and behavioral effects. S3ARD provides a continuous, parallel targeting rhythm that feeds into the joint targeting apparatus, amplifying its effects. It can help build the cognitive picture a modern commander needs to achieve coup d’œil: understanding what the adversary believes, what the adversary fears, what indicators the adversary trusts, and how friendly action can shape those perceptions before, during, and after physical maneuver.
S3ARD helps information professionals translate cognitive, behavioral, cyber, EMS, deception, space, and influence-related effects into the language of target nomination, execution, assessment, and commander decision-making. For commanders, the value of S3ARD is a decision advantage. The commander provides guidance, risk tolerance, and decision authority. Then, the operations staff translates that guidance into current and future operations. Operationalized, the NKE Cell can integrate the specialized capabilities, authorities, and assessments required to make the rhythm work.
See (Sensing the Cognitive Terrain)
Across the competition continuum, intelligence preparation must map the human terrain, especially the adversary’s cognitive landscape. What are their cultural blind spots? How does their leadership process information? This requires leveraging intelligence, including sentiment analysis and deep cultural expertise, to identify the seams in an adversary’s decision-making process. Sensing the cognitive terrain is an iterative process that enables success for the rest of the S3ARD process.
Select (Target Development and Nomination)
Based on the commander’s guidance and the cognitive terrain, the staff selects the right non-kinetic tool, timing, and convergence window for the job, with the NKE Cell integrating the required expertise, authorities, and assessment logic. Crucially, this is where S3ARD feeds directly into the Joint Targeting Cycle. Practitioners in the NKE Cell must translate this selection into target nominations for the Joint Targeting Working Group so non-kinetic effects are prioritized and synchronized with kinetic strikes. This selection must also include a proactive legal review and risk assessment, especially when an effect could spill beyond the intended audience, create escalation risk, or complicate public affairs.
Send (Execution and Synchronization)
“Send” is a shorthand for execution. For an NKE, this means releasing, maneuvering, transmitting, exposing, spoofing, signaling, or otherwise placing the selected effects into the operational environment. With JFC approval and operations synchronization, the capability launches. The launch of a non-kinetic effect should include the required authorities, permissions, and capabilities that enable follow-on actions, leveraging the principles of mission command.
In competition, the hallmark of a successful Send phase is narrative resonance. Resonant narrativesrequire coherence, fidelity, and a deep understanding of the target audience. This deep understanding of the adversary requires a commander’s strategic empathy and stems from a process that enables a commander’s coup d’œil. We need a deep, almost uncomfortable, understanding of the target audience’s worldview, fears, and biases.
In armed conflict, if we want an adversary to believe a falsehood, our physical forces must maneuver in a way that “proves” the lie, but the lie itself must be something the adversary is already culturally predisposed to believe. The foremost deception maxim, Magruder’s principle, reminds us that it is far easier to exploit an adversary’s beliefs than to alter them.
Assess (Measuring Effectiveness in the Cognitive Domain)
This is where Information staff officers get frustrated. Assessing cognitive effects requires nuancedMeasures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). MOPs, which measure friendly action, might include whether the selected cyber, EMS, deception, or messaging action was delivered as planned. MOEs, which measure outcomes, might include adversary hesitation, force repositioning, contradictory public messaging, bot-network degradation, or increased allied narrative uptake.
Changing someone’s mind takes time. True behavioral change does not happen at the speed of a Tomahawk strike. I joke with my students that after a couple of months, no one likes to change where they sit in a room. With that in mind, changing a target audience’s sentiment and observing behavioral shift may take weeks or months. In the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual, the authors note that a successful counterinsurgency strategy, which parallels many fundamentals of gray zone competition, may take many years. Furthermore, isolating the exact cause of a cognitive shift is notoriously difficult in a messy information environment filled with compounding variables. Time lags and ambiguity require a commander and staff to be comfortable with uncertainty. The NKE Cell can help aggregate trends, sentiment shifts, proxy indicators, and operational reporting, but the purpose of an assessment is to inform the commander’s judgment rather than wait for absolute proof of causality.
Authorities, classification, platform access, interagency equities, release procedures, and uneven assessment data all constrain non-kinetic effects. Many effects will remain ambiguous or impossible to attribute with confidence. That is precisely why the joint force needs a disciplined staff mechanism and iterative targeting rhythm. The complexity of non-kinetic effects mandates that they must be integrated into the commander’s decision cycle from the beginning.
Repeat (Sustainment and Reinforcement Loop)
Adversaries frequently leverage social media’s speed, reach, and volume to overwhelm the audience with misinformation. The joint force must therefore sustain, sequence, and adapt non-kinetic effects over time rather than treating them as one-time supporting actions. S3ARD is therefore cyclical. Planners must rapidly repeat actions to reinforce the narrative, outpacing the adversary’s ability to counter-message.
Decide/Debrief (Adaptation and Learning)
The final step of the S3ARD cycle requires a decision. Based on real-time friction and the adversary’s reaction, the commander must decide whether to pivot, escalate, or hold, while the operations staff drives execution and the NKE Cell feeds lessons learned back into the “See” phase. Whatever the decision, the staff needs a candid debrief or after-action review to capture what worked, what failed, and what should change. Creating a continuous learning loop enables the joint force to adapt faster than the adversary. To help the commander choose the best way forward from this point, the NKE Cell must carefully weigh coordination of authorities, release procedures, and escalation risk. The NKE Cell’s value lies in helping the staff prepare integrated options for the JFC to evaluate holistically. Over time, those lessons should be codified in plans, annexes, overlays, execution matrices, and approval pathways so that non-kinetic effects are not rediscovered during every crisis.
Operationalizing the Gray Zone
Let’s illustrate S3ARD using a notional gray-zone scenario in the Indo-Pacific. Imagine an adversary’s maritime militia swarming a contested reef belonging to a U.S. ally. The adversary leverages localized electromagnetic jamming to blind allied coast guard patrols, while simultaneously flooding regional social networks with deepfake videos claiming that the allied nation fired first. Kinetic strikes against a nominally “civilian” militia are politically out of the question. The JFC needs an off-ramp that strips the adversary of their narrative cover and fractures their operational cohesion.
The commander should direct the staff to begin the S3ARD cycle methodically. During the see phase, the team maps the electromagnetic spectrum to identify the specific adversary command node coordinating the jamming and locate the digital infrastructure driving the bot-farm disinformation.
In the select phase, they build a synchronized information package while ensuring they have the correct authorities to execute. They devise a localized offensive cyberspace operation to sever the bot farm’s connectivity and pair it with a MILDEC operation simulating a U.S. bomber task force deployment to the adversary’s highly vulnerable northern flank. Meanwhile, the team refines the commander’s narrative to reassure the ally. All the while, the NKE cell must deconflict these actions across the staff and relevant unified action partners.
The JFC approves the package, and the NKE Cell enables the send phase by integrating the required cyber, EMS, deception, space, and influence capabilities, synchronized with other operations. The bot farms’ infrastructure is disrupted. The adversary’s ISR assets intercept the deceptive indicators of bomber deployment.
During the assess phase, the operations staff and the NKE Cell monitor the MOEs over the next 72 hours and prepare options for the commander’s next decision. Space-based intelligence confirms that the adversary is repositioning its regular naval forces away from the contested reef to address the phantom-bomber threat in the north.
Recognizing the dislocation, the commander decides to exploit the confusion, initiating the operations cycle again by directing a pre-planned multinational naval exercise in the region. The exercise projects allied strength and reinforces the existing narrative. Finally, the NKE Cell debriefs and realizes that it should have husbanded the deception assets for a more critical juncture. In the real world, this sequence would be constrained by authorities, access, attribution risk, escalation concerns, interagency equities, and imperfect assessment data. The adversary might not react cleanly, the narrative might not resonate as intended, and the desired behavioral effect might take longer than the commander wants. Even so, the example illustrates the central point: when commanders own the process, operations staffs synchronize it, and the NKE Cell enables integration, S3ARD can help the joint force buy time, preserve operational space, seize the narrative initiative, and learn faster than the adversary without defaulting immediately to kinetic force.
The Decisive Terrain
Writing in the aftermath of the First World War, military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart observed a truth that has only become more relevant in the digital age: “The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men.” The S3ARD model and the NKE Cell provide mechanisms to help commanders integrate non-kinetic effects into operational design, current operations, future operations, and decision-making. S3ARD can help a staff systematically create the conditions for a modern commander’s coup d’œil, allowing them to see through the digital fog and affect the adversary’s mind.
For current and future joint leaders, understanding how to integrate cyberspace, EMSO, space, and deception in depth is the new baseline requirement. If non-kinetic targeting remains an afterthought, we will suffer operationally. The NKE Cell and S3ARD framework are essential tools, but only if commanders own the process as Nimitz did. Meanwhile, the operations staff must synchronize NKE Cell activities across current and future operations to ensure non-kinetic effects are part of a truly combined-arms approach in competition and war.
Michael Posey is an active-duty Naval Flight Officer with a subspecialty in Information Systems and Operations. He holds business degrees from Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Florida. He is pursuing his doctorate in education at Pennsylvania State University and currently serves as an Assistant Professor at the US Army War College.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the U.S. Government.